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Introduction
Problems of choice between a status quo treatment and an innovation occur often in practice. In the medical arena, the status quo may be a standard treatment for a health condition and the innovation may be a new treatment proposed by researchers. Historical experience administering the status quo treatment to populations of patients may have made its properties well understood. In contrast, the properties of the innovation may be uncertain, the only available information deriving from a randomized clinical trial. Then choice between the status quo treatment and the innovation is a statistical decision problem. This paper studies the admissibility of treatment rules when the decision maker is a planner (e.g., a physician) who must choose treatments for a population of persons who are observationally identical but who may vary in their response to treatment. We focus on the relatively simple case where treatments have binary outcomes, which we label success and failure. Then the feasible treatment rules are the functions that map the number of experimental successes into a treatment allocation specifying the fraction of the population who receive each treatment.
Section 2 formalizes the planner's problem and reviews the case where the objective of the planner is to maximize the population rate of treatment success. In this setting, a theorem of Karlin and Rubin (1956) shows that the admissible rules are ones which assign all members of the population to the status quo treatment if the number of experimental successes is below a specified threshold and all to the innovation if the number of successes is above the threshold. An interior fractional allocation of the population is possible in an admissible rule only when the number of experimental successes exactly equals the threshold.
Karlin and Rubin called this class of treatment rules monotone, but we will refer to them as KR-monotone.
In Section 3, we suppose that the objective of the planner is to maximize a concave-monotone function f(@) of the rate of treatment success. We show that this seemingly modest generalization of the welfare function is consequential. Now admissible treatment rules need not be KR-monotone; in fact, KRmonotone rules may be inadmissible. However, a weaker notion of monotonicity remains relevant. Define a fractional monotone rule to be one in which the fraction of the population assigned to the innovation weakly increases with the experimental success rate. We show that the class of fractional monotone rules is essentially complete. That is, given any rule which is not fractional monotone, there exists a fractional monotone rule that performs at least as well in all feasible states of nature. If f(@) is concave and strictly monotone, the class of fractional monotone rules is complete. That is, given any rule which is not fractional monotone, there exists a fractional monotone rule that performs at least as well in all feasible states of nature and better in some state of nature.
Further findings emerge when the welfare function has weak curvature. Let f(@) be differentiable with derivative function g(@). Suppose that, for a given positive integer M, the quantity [x(1!x)
weakly increases with x. Define an M-step monotone rule to be a fractional monotone rule that gives an interior fractional treatment assignment for no more than M consecutive values of the number of experimental successes. This definition extends the class of KR-monotone rules, which is the special case with M = 1. We show that the class of M-step monotone rules is essentially complete if the above conditions hold. This class is complete if f(@) is strictly concave or if [x(1!x) !1 ] M g(x) is strictly increasing. We also show that the class of KR-monotone rules is minimal complete if f(@) is strictly concave or [
is strictly increasing.
Section 4 investigates particular treatment rules. We find that Bayes rules and the minimax-regret rule depend on the curvature of the welfare function. These rules are KR-monotone if the curvature is sufficiently weak. However, they deliver interior fractional treatment allocations if the curvature is sufficiently strong. Computation of Bayes rules is typically straightforward. Computation of a minimaxregret rule is simple when this rule is KR-monotone but is more challenging otherwise.
Our consideration of planning problems where welfare is a nonlinear function of the rate of treatment success appears to be new to research studying treatment choice using experimental data. Previous research has examined planning problems in which experimental findings are used to inform treatment choice; see, for example, Canner (1970) , Cheng, Su, and Berry (2003 ), and Manski (2004 . However, these and (as far as we are aware) other studies have invariably assumed without comment that welfare is the rate of treatment success.
From a decision theoretic perspective, concave-monotone welfare functions are intriguing because they sometimes yields the conclusion that planners should fractionally allocate observationally identical persons across different treatments. It has been common to presume that a planner should treat observationally identical persons identically. The analysis in this paper shows that this presumption sometimes is inappropriate when a risk averse planner uses experimental data to inform treatment choice.
From a substantive perspective, consideration of concave-monotone functions of the success rate is interesting because, in expected utility theory, such functions imply distaste for mean-preserving spreads of gambles and thus express risk aversion. Public discourse on health matters, although not entirely coherent, suggests strong risk aversion. This is evident in the ancient admonition of the Hippocratic Oath that a physician should "First, do no harm." It is also evident in the drug approval process of the U. S. Food and Drug Administration, which requires that the manufacturers of pharmaceuticals demonstrate "substantial evidence of effect" for their products (see Gould, 2002) . We discuss this matter further in the concluding Section 5, which considers the implications of our analysis for treatment choice in practice.
Background
The Planning Problem
The basic concepts are as in Manski (2004 Manski ( , 2005 . The planner's problem is to choose treatments from a finite set T of mutually exclusive and exhaustive treatments. Each member j of the treatment population, denoted J, has a response function y j (@): T 6 Y mapping treatments t 0 T into outcomes y j (t) 0 Y.
The population is a probability space (J, S, P), and the probability distribution P[y(@)] of the random function y(@): T 6 Y describes treatment response across the population. The population is "large," in the sense that J is uncountable and P(j) = 0, j 0 J.
In this paper, outcomes are binary with y j (t) = 1 denoting success and y j (t) = 0 failure should person j receive treatment t. There are two treatments, t = a denoting the status quo and t = b the innovation. The population success rates if everyone were to receive the same treatment are " / P[y(a) = 1] and $ / P[y(b) = 1] respectively. Consider a rule that assigns a fraction . of the population to treatment b and the remaining 1 ! . to treatment a. The population success rate under this fractional rule is
, where f(@) is an increasing, concave transformation of the success rate.
The optimal treatment rule is obvious if (", $) are known. The planner should choose . = 1 if $ > " and . = 0 if $ < "; all values of . yield the same welfare if $ = ". The problem of interest is treatment choice when (", $) are only partially known.
The Empirical Evidence and Admissible Treatment Rules
Suppose that historical experience reveals " but not $. The available evidence on $ comes from a randomized experiment, where N subjects are drawn at random and assigned to treatment b. Of these subjects, a number n experience outcome y(b) = 1 and the remaining N ! n experience y(b) = 0. The outcomes of all subjects are observed.
In this setting, the sample size N indexes the sampling process and the number n of experimental 
Expected welfare is a function of $, which is unknown. Let % index the values of $ that the planner deems feasible. We assume that 0 < " < 1 and B includes at least one value smaller than " and at least one value greater than ". Rule zN (weakly) dominates rule z if W(z; $) # W(zN; $) for all $ 0 % and W(z; $) < W(zN; $)
for some $ 0 %. Rule z is admissible if there exists no other rule zN that dominates z; if a dominating rule exists, z is inadmissible.
Admissible Rules for a Risk-Neutral Planner
Manski (2005, Chapter 3) considers the case in which welfare is the population rate of treatment success; thus, f(@) is the identity function. Then the expected welfare of rule z is
where E $ [z(n)] = 3 n p(n; $)@z(n). Rule z is admissible if there exists no zN such that (
A KR-monotone treatment rule, defined in Karlin and Rubin (1956) , has the form (4) z(n) = 0 for n < k, z(n) = 8 for n = k, z(n) = 1 for n > k, where 0 # k # N and 0 # 8 # 1. Thus, a KR-monotone rule allocates all persons to treatment a if n is smaller than the specified threshold k, a fraction 8 to treatment b if n = k, and all to treatment b if n is larger than k. 
Admissible Treatment Rules for Risk-Averse Planners
Determination of the admissible treatment rules when the function f(@) is nontrivially concave is a challenging problem. However, there are ways to make progress. This section presents findings that shed some light on the matter. Section 3.1 shows that the class of fractional monotone rules is essentially complete for all concave-monotone f(@). This class is complete if f(@) is concave and strictly monotone.
Section 3.2 shows that the class of M-step monotone rules is essentially complete for all
is weakly increasing in x. This class is
is strictly increasing in x. Section 3.3 shows that the class of KR-monotone rules is minimal complete if f(@) is also strictly concave or if
strictly increasing in x. However, we show that KR-monotone rules can be inadmissible if f(@) is sufficiently curved.
The Fractional Monotone Rules Are an Essentially Complete Class
The Binomial density function possesses the strict form of the monotone-likelihood ratio property:
Thus, larger values of n are unambiguously evidence
for larger values of $. It is therefore reasonable to conjecture that good treatment rules are ones that make the fraction of the population allocated to treatment b increase with n.
The results of Karlin and Rubin (1956) show that a strong form of this conjecture is correct if f(@)
is linear in the population success rate. The Karlin and Rubin theorems do not apply to nonlinear f(@).
Nevertheless, the conjecture remains correct in the weaker sense that the class of fractional monotone treatment rules is essentially complete for all concave-monotone welfare functions and complete when f(@) is concave and strictly monotone. Formally, we say that a treatment rule z is fractional monotone if n < nN Y z(n) # z(nN). Proposition 1 proves the result.
Proposition 1: If f(@) is weakly increasing and concave, the class of fractional monotone rules is essentially complete. If f(@) is also strictly increasing, the class of fractional monotone rules is complete. P roof: Suppose that z is not fractional monotone, so z(n) < z(nN) for some n > nN. Consider replacing z with the following treatment rule z * :
For any value of $,
The function f(@) is concave and z * (n) is a convex combination of z(n) and z(nN). Hence,
The same inequality holds for f[" + ($ ! ")@z * (nN)]. Substituting these inequalities into (5) and rearranging terms yields
The following inequalities use the monotone-likelihood ratio property and the fact that z(n) < z(nN):
It follows that W(z * ; $) $ W(z; $) for all $ 0 #. If f(@) is strictly increasing, the right-hand side inequalities are strict and W(z * ; $) > W(z; $) for all $ 0 %({"}.
Given any rule z that is not fractional monotone, we can iteratively apply the transformation described above to all pairs (nN, n) for which z(nN) > z(n), in the following order: (nN, n) = (1, 2), (1, 3) , . .
. , (1, N), (2, 3), (2, 4),. . . , (N!1, N). The result is a fractional monotone treatment rule that performs at least as well as z for all values of $ and that dominates z if f(@) is strictly increasing.
Q. E. D.
Proposition 1 implies that a risk-neutral or risk-averse planner can restrict attention to fractional monotone treatment rules; there is no reason to contemplate other rules. The proposition does not imply that all fractional monotone rules are worthy of consideration. Indeed, we already know that a risk-neutral planner can restrict attention to rules that are KR-monotone.
M-step Monotone Rules
It appears that no result stronger than Proposition 1 can be proved without placing restrictions on the shape of f(@) beyond monotonicity and concavity. This section shows that Proposition 1 can be strengthened considerably if f(@) is restricted to be differentiable with derivative function g(@) that does not decrease too rapidly.
We define a treatment rule to be M-step monotone if n < nN Y z(n) # z(nN) and, for a given positive
weakly increases with x. With this restriction on the curvature of f(@), the class of M-step monotone rules is essentially complete, whatever the sample size N may be. Moreover, this class is complete if f(@) is strictly concave or if
strictly increases with x. Proposition 2 proves the result.
Proposition 2: Let f(@) be weakly increasing, concave and differentiable on (inf {B}, sup {B}), with A. Suppose that z is not M-step monotone, with z(n) > 0 and z(nN) < 1 for some (n, nN) such that n+M # nN.
We will compare z to an alternative treatment rule zN in which z(n) and z(nN) are replaced by
Observe that rule zN has either zN(n) = 0 or zN(nN) = 1. We will show that zN performs at least as well as z.
It dominates z if f(@) is strictly concave or if
strictly increases with x.
To show this requires two preliminary steps. First, weak concavity of f(@) implies that
These inequalities are strict if f(@) is strictly concave.
Second, p(nN; x)p -1 (n; x)g(x) weakly increases with x for n+M # nN. This holds because
The first term on the right-hand side is a positive constant. The second term is a positive and weakly increasing function on (0, 1). The last term is positive and weakly increasing by assumption. If
is strictly increasing, then so is p(nN; x)p -1 (n; x)g(x). Now consider the difference in welfare between rules zN and z. All rules yield the same welfare if
The first inequality follows from (7). The second equality follows from (6). The last inequality holds for all $ because the first two terms have the same sign when they do not equal zero and the last two terms are If z(0) = 0, we perform the iterations for n = 1. As in the first round, these iterations preserve fractional monotonicity and deliver an M-step rule if z(1) > 0 at their completion. If z(1) = 0, we perform the iterations for n = 2, 3, . . , continuing through further rounds of iteration until an M-step rule is achieved.
The ultimate result of the iterative process is an M-step monotone rule that performs at least as well as z for all values of $. Hence, the class of M-step monotone rules is essentially complete.
is strictly increasing, the treatment rule obtained through the iterated modification dominates the original rule z. Thus, the M-step monotone rules form a complete class.
KR-Monotone Rules Revisited
The (10) n: z(n) $ zN(n) with strict inequality for some n Y W(z; $) > W(zN; $), $ 0 (", 1), n: z(n) # zN(n) with strict inequality for some n Y W(z; $) > W(zN; $), $ 0 (0, ").
Therefore, zN cannot dominate z. Thus, all KR-monotone rules are admissible.
If the class of KR-monotone rules is complete, there exist no admissible rules outside of this class.
Hence, the class of KR-monotone rules is minimal complete.
Q. E. D.
Combining Propositions 2 and 3 shows that Theorem 4 of Karlin and Rubin (1956) extends to welfare functions that are concave-monotone with sufficiently weak curvature. We state this result as denoting the derivative function. Let the space % contain only two values, one lower than " and the other higher; thus, % = {$ L , $ H }, where $ L < " < $ H . For a specified k with 0 # k # N and a specified pair (v, w) with 0 # v # w # 1, define the treatment rule (11) z vw (n) = v for n # k, z vw (n) = w for n > k.
A special case is the KR-monotone rule z 01 .
Proposition 4 compares rule z 01 with a non-extreme fractional rule z vw ; that is, one with 0 < v # w < 1. We find that rule z 01 strictly dominates z vw if the derivative function g(@) decreases sufficiently slowly and vice versa if g(@) decreases sufficiently rapidly.
Proposition 4: Let f(@) be strictly increasing and differentiable. Fix k. Let d L / 3 n > k p(n; $ L ) and d H / 3 n > k p(n; $ H ). Let 0 < v # w < 1. Rule z 01 strictly dominates z vw if
Rule z vw strictly dominates z 01 if
roof: By (2), the expected welfare of rules z 01 and z vw in the two feasible states of nature are as follows: Ceteris paribus, the direction of the inequalities depends on the curvature of f(@). By assumption, f(@) is concave and strictly increasing. Hence, its derivative g(@) is weakly decreasing and everywhere positive. Use the mean-value theorem to rewrite (14c) and (14d) as (14a) and (14b) with (14c)N and (14d)N shows that rule z 01 strictly dominates z vw if and only if
Rule z vw strictly dominates z 01 if and only if these inequalities are reversed.
Whether (15a)- (15b) Q. E. D.
Bayes and Minimax-Regret Rules
To learn more about how the shape of the welfare function affects treatment choice, we next study the behavior of Bayes rules and the minimax-regret rule. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 present some analytical findings for Bayes rules and the minimax-regret rule respectively. Section 5 will report some numerical findings for the minimax-regret and other rules.
Bayesian Planning
A Bayesian planner places a prior subjective probability distribution, say A, on the set #. Observing the number n of experimental successes in the randomized trial, he forms a posterior distribution, say A($|n).
Treating $ as a random variable with distribution A($|n), the planner then solves the problem
Proposition 5 shows that, given a regularity condition, the Bayes rule assigns the entire population 
).]dA($|n) strictly increases with . in a neighborhood of . = 0, implying that solutions to (16) are positive.
If If($)dA($| n) < f("), then . = 1 does not solve (16). Hence, solutions are fractional.
Q. E. D.
Observe that the concavity and differentiability restrictions placed on f(@) are used in different parts of the proposition. The proof of part (a) only uses the assumption that f(@) is strictly concave. The proof of part (b) only uses the assumption that f(@) is continuously differentiable and the stated regularity condition.
Minimax-Regret Planning
The minimax-regret criterion for treatment choice uses no prior information beyond the planner's knowledge that $ lies in the set #. Let Z denote the space of all functions that map [0, . . . , N] 6 [0, 1]. For
is the maximum welfare achievable given knowledge of $, W(z; $) is the expected welfare achieved by rule z(@), and the difference between these quantities is regret R(z; $):
A minimax-regret rule z mmr solves the problem
(Another criterion that uses no information beyond knowledge of # is the maximin rule. We do not consider it because it is ultra-conservative, entirely ignoring the sample data. If # contains any value smaller than ", the maximin rule assigns the entire population to the status quo, whatever the sample size may be.) Stoye (2005) has shown that when f(@) is linear and # = [0, 1], there exists an easily computable KRmonotone minimax-regret rule that satisfies the condition
We show here that minimax-regret rules have a similar characterization for nonlinear f(@) if the class of KRmonotone rules is essentially complete. To simplify exposition, let f(@) be strictly increasing and continuous on (0, 1). Let B be a closed subset of (0, 1).
Each KR-monotone rule is defined by two numbers: the integer k specifying the location of the step and the fraction 8 specifying the fraction of the population assigned to treatment b when there are k experimental successes. The sum k + (1 ! 8) = 3 n = 0...N [1 ! z(n)] uniquely indexes each KR-monotone rule.
That is, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of all KR-monotone rules and the interval 
, then z!(n) $ z(n) for all n, with strict inequality for one value of n. Moreover,
The quantity max $ 0 B 1 (0, "] R(@ ; $) is a strictly decreasing and continuous function of the index
is strictly increasing and continuous. Hence, there is a unique rule that minimizes maximum regret among KR-monotone rules. It satisfies the condition max R(z mmr ; $) = max R(z mmr ; $).
If the class of KR-monotone rules is essentially complete, this treatment rule solves problem (18). The same results hold for KR-monotone rules if B = (0, 1) and f(@) satisfies the conditions of Proposition 2 for M = 1.
The situation is different if f(@) has strong curvature and # contains positive values arbitrarily close to 0. Then a minimax-regret rule never assigns the entire population to treatment b. Proposition 6 gives the result.
Proposition 6: Let " > 0. Let # contain a sequence of positive values that converges to zero. If
for some M $ 0, then z mmr (n) < 1 for all n # M regardless of sample size N. P roof: Let z 0 denote the treatment rule that always assigns everyone to treatment a; thus, z 0 (n) = 0 for all values of n. This rule has finite maximum regret sup
Hence, any treatment rule with infinite maximum regret cannot be minimax regret. Suppose z(n) = 1, then
follows from (19). Hence, the minimax-regret rule must have z mmr (n) < 1.
To illustrate, consider the welfare function f(x) = !x !K , where K > 1. Then (19) holds for M < K and z mmr (n) < 1 for n < K. Consider the function f(x) = -exp(1/x). Then (19) holds for all values of M and z mmr (n) < 1 for any n.
Implications for Treatment Choice in Practice
This concluding section explores some implications of our analysis for the practice of treatment choice. In the course of doing so, we present numerical findings that add texture to the analysis.
Test-Based Rules in Medicine
Although problems of choice between a status quo treatment and an innovation occur often in practice, explicit use of statistical decision theory to make such choices is rare. In the medical arena, the branch of statistics that has strongly influenced practice has been hypothesis testing rather than decision theory. Indeed, testing the hypothesis of zero average treatment effect is institutionalized in the U. S. (Fisher and Moyé, 1999) . In the context of treatments with binary outcomes, this means performance of a test with null hypothesis {H 0 : $ = "} and alternative {H 1 : $ > "}.
The use of an hypothesis test to choose between the status quo treatment and an innovation gives the status quo a privileged position and, thus, might be loosely construed as an expression of risk aversion.
However, the classical practice of handling the null and alternative hypotheses asymmetrically, fixing the probability of a type I error and seeking to minimize the probability of a type II error, is difficult to motivate from the perspective of treatment choice. Moreover, error probabilities at most measure the chance of choosing a sub-optimal rule. They do not measure the loss in welfare resulting from a sub-optimal choice.
Even if statistical decision theory does not motivate treatment rules based on hypothesis tests, we can productively use decision theory to evaluate such rules. In the setting of this paper, a conventional test- Now compare the maximum regret of the three treatment rules. In every case, the maximum regret of the test-based rule is much larger than that of the minimax-regret rule. When the sample size is larger than ten, the ratio of the former maximum regret to the latter is typically about 5 to 1. These ratios quantify the inferiority of the test-based rule when viewed from the vantage of maximum regret.
One should not conclude that the test-based rule is inferior in all states of nature. Being admissible, this rule must yield smaller regret in some states of nature. The test-based rule, which "stacks the deck" in favor of the status quo treatment, delivers smaller regret than the minimax-regret rule in states of nature with $ < " and larger regret in states with $ > ". The clear inferiority of the rule in terms of maximum regret arises because, under both the linear and log welfare functions, the latter losses are much larger than the former gains.
Observe that the maximum regret of the plug-in rule is close to that of the minimax-regret rule.
Indeed, the two are nearly the same at the bottom of each jag of the plug-in rule. Although the minimaxregret rule is relatively easy to compute, the plug-in rule is simpler yet. Hence, the plots indicate that a practitioner who is not equipped to compute the minimax-regret rule would suffer little by using the plug-in rule as an approximation. For example, the value 2.7 on the y-axis of Figure 2 means that k = 2 and 8 = 0.3. Figure 2 shows that moving from the linear to log welfare function has very little effect on the minimax-regret rule. The KR-threshold k + (1!8) is nearly the same under both welfare functions. When " = 0.75, the quantitative change in k + (1!8) is so small as barely to be visible. When " = 0.25, the change is more noticeable but its magnitude is still small. In both cases, the plots with respect to sample size are close to parallel to one another. We have computed analogs to Figure 2 for " as small as 0.01, and found that the variation in the rule across welfare functions is still small and that the plots remain close to parallel.
Figure 2 also shows the empirical plug-in rule. It is very similar to the two minimax-regret rules, the primary difference being that it is a step function rather one that varies smoothly with N. This similarity explains why, in Figure 1 , we found that the maximum regret of the plug-in rule is close to that of the minimax-regret rule.
Taken in combination, our analytical findings and the numerical findings in Figure 2 indicate that concavity of the welfare function does not per se have important consequences for treatment choice. What matters is the degree of curvature of the welfare function. We cannot say how curved a welfare function should be in practice. The answer to this question is necessarily context specific. 
